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FACTORS INFLUENCING LEASE REVENUE AND NON-INDUSTRIAL LANDOWNERS’ 
WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW HUNTING ACCESS 
 
Anwar Hussain, Ian A. Munn, Emily K. Loden 




Despite the fact that earnings associated with selling hunting leases could significantly contribute 
to landowners’ incomes, only a small minority of them allow access on their lands for a fee.  
Based on a sample survey of Mississippi state landowners, we analyzed landowners’ willingness 
to participate in supplying leases as well as factors influencing lease revenue per fee acre.  While 
landowners’ decision to allow hunting access and factors influencing lease revenue per acre were 
jointly modeled consistent with Heckman’s analysis of sample selectivity bias, the hunting lease 
revenue function was specified in accordance with Rosen’s hedonic pricing theory.  Empirical 
results showed landowners’ concerns about control over their land, loss of privacy and damage 
to property, and accident liability insurance reduced their willingness to allow hunting access; 
and, in contrast, increase in total land holding, race and residential location increased the 
probability of participation.  With regards to factors explaining differences in lease revenue per 
fee acre, analysis showed that location, expertise in managing fee hunting enterprise, provision 
of services, and certain wildlife habitats account for systematic variations in lease revenues.  
These findings have implications for landowners’ management of their lands, the design of 
extension programs, and public agencies engaged in the provision of natural resource based 
recreation.  
Keywords: Marginal lands, Mississippi, Incentive programs, Recreation, Wildlife enterprises 
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Interest in the potential for hunting access on non-industrial private lands is rising for a variety of 
reasons (Benson 2001; Jones et al. 2001).  These reasons include supplemental income for 
landowners, and incentives to restore marginal or degraded lands as they find it in their interest 
to engage in wildlife habitat improvement.  Especially for the small, non-industrial landowners 
who have to wait years for timber sale revenues to realize, the flow of annual hunting lease 
income could be a significant benefit (Yarrow and Yarrow 1998).  In addition, hunting access on 
private lands has implications for hunters’ welfare as congestion on public recreation lands rises, 
and the financial burden on various levels of government to protect marginal lands.  However, 
while all these considerations certainly point to the existence of Pareto superior allocation on 
private lands from all stakeholders’ perspective, there is not much recent research about 
landowners’ willingness to allow hunting access on their lands and the factors that determine 
why among the small minority of landowners who do allow access for a fee, some are able to 
realize higher per acre hunting lease income than others.  Previous research on hunters’ 
willingness to pay for leases and site attributes they prefer has yielded some insights
1 that are 
helpful to the debate on hunting access on private lands, especially how private landowners 
might exploit them to their advantage by investing in those site attributes and thus attracting 
                                                 
1  See for instance, Livengood, 1971; Pope et al. 1985; Messonnier and Luzar, 1990; Mackenzie 
1990, Stribling et al. 1992; Boxall et al. 1996, Gan and Luzar, 1993, and Hussain et al. 2004.   4
hunters.  Direct evidence as to factors that explain observed hunting lease revenues is, however, 
available from Loomis and Fitzhugh (1989), Baen (1997) and Zhang et al. (2005).  Also while 
one may gain some insights by looking at hunting lease rates charged by large forest industries 
(Roach et al. 1996), they are not be indicative of observed lease revenues on private lands 
because forest industries are motivated by other considerations such generating community 
goodwill that in turn could be instrumental in reducing probability of fire, protection of lands or 
gaining leverage in anticipation of environmental regulations.  This study aims to analyze factors 
that explain landowners’ participation in hunting leases and why certain landowners that allow 
access are able to earn more than others.  In the next section, we conceptualize major aspects of 
the hunting lease market, followed by a description of the estimation methods we use.  Data 
generation, empirical results and concluding remarks are given at the end.    
HEDONIC LEASE FUNCTION AND LANDOWNERS’ WILLINGNESS 
One may think of hedonic lease function to result from the interaction of the demand and supply 
of hunting site characteristics.  The conceptual framework developed by Rosen (1974) thus 
provides the guiding construct for this study.
2 The technique uses systematic variation in price 
associated with characteristics of goods to impute willingness to pay for the characteristics, and 
assumes that the market for the good is a single integrated market in equilibrium, and that the 
good in question has a large number of levels of available characteristics from which buyers can 
choose.  While the hunting lease market in the southeast US is not yet not fully integrated and 
                                                 
2 Earlier applications of the technique to site differentiation include Miranowski, A. John and 
Brian, D. Hammes (1984) and Palmquist, B. Raymond, and Leon, E. Danielon (1989).  See also, 
Le Goffe, P. (2000) for a recent application.    5
efficient due to informational constraints and skewed distribution of land ownership, it can 
reasonably be expected to meet these assumptions.   
Of the two economic agents that interact in a hunting lease market, private landowners are the 
suppliers of hunting sites who maximize profits equating lease rate per unit to its opportunity 
cost in equilibrium while hunters demand hunting tracts to maximize utility by using hunting 
tracts along with other market purchased goods and personal time to produce “recreational 
experience” in a household production framework.  In equilibrium, hunters equate willingness to 
pay for a hunting site to the sum of the value of marginal products of hunting site 
characteristics.
3 While in the short run, landowners recoup only average variable cost, in the long 
run they are assumed to supply hunting tracts conditional on fully recovery of relevant 
opportunity cost.      
I. Determinants of hedonic lease function 
 Hunting lease revenue
4 may vary across regions and individual hunting sites for a variety of 
reasons.  We identify habitat type, investment in habitat improvement, provision of services by 
                                                 
3 Ladd, G. W., and M.B. Martin. 1976, p.22. For an earlier application of Ladd and Martin ideas 
to a forestry issue, see, Puttock, et al. (1990).  
4 Note that hunting lease contracts vary in duration, game allowed for harvest and unit of 
account.  With regards to duration, a hunting lease contract may be for a short term such as 1 day 
to 3 months, annual or multi-annual; game allowed for harvest may either include waterfowl, 
turkey, or deer, or any combination thereof.  In terms of unit of account, leases may be transacted 
on per acre, per gun or per hunting club basis. Specificity about the type of hunting lease 
especially becomes important when one wants to estimate price elasticity: the broadly defined a 
hunting lease, the lower the lease rate elasticity with respect to changes in a given covariate.      6
landowners, scale of wildlife enterprise operation, and regional differences to account for 
variations in lease revenue.  
Habitat differentiation: Game abundance, diversity and quality can be expected to positively 
relate to hunters’ willingness to pay.  However, while deciding on a lease contract, hunters form 
their expectations of quality recreation on the basis of site attributes, especially tract size, land 
use pattern, forest cover type, forest stand structure and age distribution, etc.  As this information 
is at the same time available to landowners, habitat differentiation can reasonably be expected to 
facilitate convergence of landowners and hunters on a particular lease rate per unit.  In this 
regards, one may think of natural bottomland hardwoods to serve as a benchmark of premium 
hunting sites as these forests can support two to five times as many game animals as nearby 
mixed pine and hardwood forests.  The richness and high productivity of these forests translate 
into a comparable richness of wildlife (Harris et al. 1984).  Next along the continuum are upland 
hardwoods, followed by mixed pine hardwoods, and pine lands because unlike pinelands, 
hardwoods not only provide cover but food as well almost throughout the year.   
In areas where agriculture is a major land use activity, orchards especially those of pecan trees, 
pasturelands, and certain agricultural croplands that attract turkey, deer and other game could 
support higher game populations and thus generate higher lease revenues.  However, the pattern 
of lease rate on agricultural lands could be very complex given the relatively higher probability 
of wildlife-agricultural land use conflicts, and variety of agricultural practices with varying 
wildlife benefits.  In the face of this incompatibility, agricultural landowners in certain areas may 
even have an incentive to charge rather lower rates to control wildlife populations.    
Investment in wildlife habitat improvement: Following Palmquist (1989) we may think of 
wildlife habitat to have certain characteristics that are within landowner’s control.  Depending on   7
expected net returns, producer rationality implies that landowners may invest in these 
characteristics.  Thus, private lands owners who allocate certain areas to wildlife food plots, and 
actively/or passively flood others could be expected to fetch higher returns.   
Provision of services: Evidence regarding the role of the provision of services by landowners is 
mixed.  While Pope et al. (1985) and Messonnier and Luzar (1990) did not find evidence to 
support the claim that hunters would be willing to pay more because of this reason, recognizing 
that services can range from very simple to quite elaborate it is likely that services would 
influence lease revenues.  It is thus important to construct a services index to serve as an 
explanatory variable while determining lease revenues.   
Scale of operation: Many factors bear on the relationship between leases rate and scale of 
wildlife enterprise operation.  First, one would expect elasticity of demand for hunting access to 
depend on availability of substitute access options such as public land, or opportunities on 
friends/ acquaintances lands, and land size/ownership distribution pattern in a given region.  
Second, given that wildlife hunting like other recreation activities is a luxury good, demand for 
hunting leases is more likely elastic.  Consequently, private landowners, especially very large 
ones, would have an incentive to lower lease rates in order to increase total revenue.          
Location and market forces: While recognizing the importance of factors highlighted above in 
influencing lease rate, there are regional and location level market forces to account for as well.  
Thus, otherwise similar hunting sites may earn different per acre lease revenues across regions 
depending on the circumstances such as supply of public recreational lands relative to public 
demand, overall land use pattern, accessibility considerations, and the manner human population 
is distributed in a region.   
   8
II. Landowners’ willingness to allow hunting access 
Beyond the obvious reason whether a landowner has sufficiently large tract(s) of land, a diverse 
set of factors underlie private landowners’ willingness to allow hunting access on their lands.  
One, a majority of landowners may not find potential financial returns associated with hunting 
access sufficient to offset their opportunity cost of time and other resources.  Two, concerns for 
personal safety, privacy, accident liability insurance, damages to crops, timber and other property 
(Lynch and Robinson, 1998) could operate as serious constraints and in certain cases as the only 
limiting factor in whether or not a landowner leases his land.  Three, not having enough technical 
expertise about leasing in terms of its tax and other legal ramifications, and understanding of 
wildlife habitat management are also important.  Lastly, socio-demographics characteristics such 
as residential location, race, gender, education, and personal idiosyncrasy of being against 
wildlife hunting on moral or other grounds and past experience with rowdy hunters’ behavior 
have also been pointed out (Guynn and Schmidt 1984) to underlie landowners’ aversion to 
allowing hunting access.   
ESTIMATION METHODS  
 
We use a simultaneous equation model of landowners’ participation and hedonic lease function 
consistent with Heckman sample selection model (1979).  This choice is motivated by the 
realization that if the difference between landowners’ reservation lease rate and market lease rate 
is positive, they would not be willing to participate in leasing.  But landowners who allow 
hunting access for the opposite reason would constitute a nonrandom sample.  Under these 
circumstances, the possibility of sample selection arises because unobservable factors 
determining inclusion in the sub-sample of landowners who lease their lands might be correlated 
with the unobservable factors influencing the hedonic lease function. Consequently, parameter   9
estimates of the hedonic lease function would be biased and inconsistent unless they are jointly 
estimated.  Further details describing the two equations and their technical relation to each other 
are given below.  
Sample selection model: Let  i x′and i w′ be vectors of observations on predetermined variables, β 
and α as the associated unknown parameter vectors, µ σ  and  1 = ε σ  are standard deviations
5 of i µ  
and εi respectively and ρ is correlation between µi and εi.  Following Davidson and Mackinnon 




































































i     E q - 1  




i z such that 
  
*
i i y y =      if   ; 0
* > i z  else  0 = i y   
   1 = i z    if  0
* > i z    else  0 = i z  
The conditional expectation of observed i y is β i x′ , i.e., ordinary least squares estimates of β are 
unbiased only when the errors µi and εi are uncorrelated (H0: ρ=0); otherwise it is affected by 
variables in the selection equation.  To test whether the errors are indeed uncorrelated, note that 
the incidentally truncated bivariate normal distribution implies (Greene, 2003, p.781) that the 
conditional expectation of the observed i y is  
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5 As the variance of εi is unidentified, commonly a value of 1 is assigned to it.   

































= is the inverse Mills ratio, and  (.) φ and 
(.) Φ are respectively the normal density function and normal distribution function. Thus, 
evidence in support of H0: ρ=0 exists when the coefficient on  i λ (.) is statistically insignificant.  
Eq-2 suggests that consistent estimates of β can be obtained using ordinary least squares 
regression of the observed i y on i x′and estimated i λ (.) where the unknowns in i λ (.) can be 
obtained from a probit estimation of  i z on i w′.  Obtaining consistent estimators this way is, 
however, problematic
6 because it does not impose the constraint  1 | | ≤ ρ  as implied by the 
underlying model; the standard errors are inconsistent because the regression model is 
intrinsically heteroskedastic due to selection and assume normality despite that it is not efficient.  
Thus, maximum likelihood estimates are generally preferred which are consistent and 
asymptotically efficient under the assumption of normality and homoskedasticity of the 
uncensored distribution. Davidson and Mackinnon (2004, p. 488) recommend using the two-step 
estimation method as a preliminary assessment tool to be followed by full information maximum 
likelihood estimation.          
Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Given that there are two types of observations for the sample 
selection model, the likelihood function is the sum of two probabilities
7.  For observations where 
i z  =1, the likelihood is the probability of the event that both i y and  i z >0.  For the ith 
observation, this probability is written as  
) , , | 0 Pr( ) ( ) , ( | 0 , Pr( i i i i i i i i i x w y z y f x w z y ′ ′ > = ′ ′ >  
                                                 
6 Hall, H. Bronwyn (2002). Notes on Sample Selection Models, Mimeo. 
7 Ibid.,     11
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For observations where  i z  =0, the likelihood is just the marginal probability that  i z ≤0, and is 
written as 
). ( 1 ) ( ) Pr( ) 0 Pr( α α α ε i i i i i w w w z ′ Φ − = ′ − Φ = ′ − ≤ = ≤           E q - 4    
For both set of sample observations, the log-likelihood is then  
∑ ∑
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w L  Eq-5 
Marginal Effects: The possibility that an independent variable may appear both in the selection 
and outcome equations suggests that the marginal effect of an independent variable on the mean 








































λ         E q - 6  
to account for the fact that it influences the mean value of observed i y through its presence in i λ  
as well (Breen, Pp.42-43; Greene p.783).  Here g denotes a particular value of  . α i w′   
DATA AND VARIABLES  
 
Requisite data for this study were collected using a self administered mailed survey of non-
industrial landowners owning a minimum of 100 acres in Mississippi.  These landowners were 
identified and randomly selected from the property tax records of 67 Mississippi counties.  One   12
hundred acres was chosen as a minimum to target only landowners who participate in wildlife 
enterprises, and eliminate urban and suburban properties within property tax records.  In October 
2003, 2000 questionnaires were mailed to a stratified random sample of Mississippi landowners.  
Consistent with Dillman (1978) survey approach, landowners were mailed a reminder postcard 
one week afterwards and a second questionnaire 4 weeks later.  The first mailing was October 
29, 2003 and the last was November 25, 2003. 
The sample was stratified into four ownership classes:  1) 100-199 acres, 2) 200-499 acres, 3) 
500-999 acres, and 4) 1,000 and more acres.  Thirty percent of the sample (n = 600) was sent 
100-199 acres ownership class, another 30% (n = 600) of the sample was sent to the 200-499 
acres ownership class, 16% (n = 320) was sent to 500-999 acres ownership class, and 24% (n = 
480) was sent to the 1,000 and more acres ownership class.  To ensure a certain minimum 
number of large landowners in the sample, those in the 1000 or more ownership class were over 
sampled.  A weighting variable was later constructed and used during estimation to reflect the 
actual distribution of landowners in various land size classes.   
A total of 484 questionnaires were returned implying a 30 percent response rate.  However, due 
to missing data on variables of interest to this study such household income and especially 
hunting lease revenue, 16 cases were removed resulting in the final useable sample of 468.  
Using survey data thus generated, requisite variables consistent with the methodological 
approach described earlier were constructed.  While descriptive statistics of the variables are 
given in Table 2, certain details follow:  
I. Hedonic lease function  
 
Hunting lease market segmentation: Hedonic pricing requires that the market of interest be 
integrated for estimated implicit prices to be unbiased.  Three regional markets were thus   13
identified: eastern Mississippi (EAST) encompassing areas surrounding Tupelo-Columbus, 
southern Mississippi with Biloxi-Gulfport as the center (SOUTH), and Jackson-Greenville area 
to the west (WEST).  Segmentation along theses boundaries not only ensures buffering how the 
state population is clustered but conforms to overall land use pattern as well.  During estimation, 
this delineation was forced through a set of 3 dummies, DEAST, DSOUTH, and DWEST, with 
DWEST to serve as the base category.  As an alternative to the above regional delineation, a 
variable “number of miles” hunting tracts were located relative to 10 major cities in the state was 
created, but not found helpful.   
 Lease type: An array of fee arrangements exist in Mississippi including annual and seasonal 
leases, and brokerage and short term agreements.  The dependent variable in this study is gross 
annual revenue per acre.  Annual leases seem to be the norm as of the 77 landowners that leased 
lands, over 75 percent were annual leases.  Differences in gross annual revenue per acre due to 
fee arrangement were accounted for by defining a dummy variable “LTYP” such that LTYP=1 if 
the arrangement was brokerage or short term agreement, else LTYP=0. 
Scale of operation: The inclusion of this variable is important to obtaining unbiased parameter 
estimates of the hedonic lease function. Measured by the “number of acres leased” and 
transformed in logarithms, we include LALSD as an explanatory variable to capture differences 
in lease rate due to scale of operations.  Characterizing the hunting lease market, while on the 
supply side a minority of landowners owns a significant share of the land, on the demand there 
are a large number of hunters that have options  to access public, own or friends/acquaintances 
lands.  This suggests a market structure more akin to monopolistic competition and the influence 
of acres leased on gross annual revenue per acre would need to be seen in this context.        14
Landowners’ knowledge of operating wildlife enterprises: To account for differences in gross 
annual revenue per acre due to differences in landowners’ management competencies, we 
constructed two variables:  landowners’ experience with hunting leases, and how confident they 
believed having knowledge of operating a fee-hunting enterprise.  Experience as measured by the 
“number of years lease operations were run” did not prove to be significant and thus discarded.  
In this study, landowners’ management competency is thus captured by asking them to rate the 
amount of information they had about business planning fee hunting and/ or wildlife related fee 
access operation on a scale of 1-5 whereby 1, 2, and 3 indicated “no or some information”, while 
4 and 5 codified “complete information”.  For estimation purposes, the ratings were later 
dichotomized so that if landowner’s own rating of information at his/her disposal was 4 or 5, the 
dummy EXPNC=1, and if the rating was 1, 2, or 3, EXPNC= 0.   
Provision of services by landowners: The survey form sought information on a wide list of 
services generally considered to facilitate hunters.  In our resulting sample, only 26 of the 77 
landowners provided any service or a combination thereof.  The following 3 broad categories 
were identifiable: a) blinds, guides, stands and lodging, represented by mnemonic SERVCS, b) 
percent of land under waterfowl impoundment (PLWI) and, c) maintenance and/or provision of 
the percent of land for wildlife food plots (PLWFP).  Of these, we think of the last 2 categories 
of services essentially as aspects of wildlife habitat that are under the control of landowner.   
Wildlife habitat differentiation: Alternative characterizations of wildlife habitat exist.  For 
instance, there is a characterization by Brown et al. (1978) and a variation of the same thereof by 
Clark and Stankey (1979) that identifies factors defining outdoor recreation opportunity settings.  
This is essentially a system approach to recreation management which is motivated by the need 
to accommodate diversity.  A narrow but more relevant approach to understanding hunting lease   15
rates is by McKee (1990) which is based on the idea that certain habitat features are associated 
with greater wildlife quality than others.  Accordingly, point values are assigned to 15 distinct 
habitat features, which are then used to construct a composite score for a particular land tract.  
These scores serve to classify hunting tracts into one of the following land classes: exceptional, 
excellent, above average, fair and poor, with exceptional tracts commanding highest lease rate 
while poor tracts to fetch lowest rates
8.  However, note that habitat differences alone cannot 
account for lease rate variations as McKee scoring of habitat and Baen’s approach seems to 
imply.  Factors such as scale of operations, regional considerations, and landowner marketing 
expertise, and services may also affect lease rate - the approach we follow in this study.  Our 
characterization of hunting sites, with percent of land under bottomland hardwoods and 
permanent water bodies (PBHWPW) to serve as the base category, is given in table 1.  
II. Determinants of landowners’ willingness 
 Factors hypothesized to influence landowners’ willingness to allow hunting access may be 
classified as technical, financial, personal idiosyncratic, and socio-demographic.   
Technical constraints: We use total number of acres owned (LAOWD, expressed in logarithm) 
to proxy technical constraints to participation.  Landowners who do not own a certain minimum 
size tract at one location would be technically constrained because big game including deer, 
turkey, and wild hog require large tracts to serve as home range.  While ideally it is the largest 
tract size that determines participation, being a large landowner is likely to increase the 
                                                 
8 See also Baen (1997) who has constructed hunting lease indices using deer densities, trophy 
quality and location attributes of hunting sites. Baen argues that his indices could be used by 
agricultural land investors to quantify the recreational component of the market value of 
agricultural lands.     16
probability of having a larger tract. Using total land ownership rather than how large tract a 
given landowner has should not be a big concern. 
Personal idiosyncratic attributes: Codified as a set of dummy variables, we use identify 4 
concerns: concern for who is using the land, concern for personal safety and privacy, concern for 
accident liability insurance, and concern about damage to crops, timber and property to limit 
landowners’ willingness to allow hunting access.  Data on these attributes were generated by 
asking whether any of these have been a problem expressed on a Likert scale of 1 to 5, with 1,2,3 
to mean “NO”, and 4 or 5 to mean “YES”.  Accordingly, we defined dummy variables CWUL= 
1 if landowner was concerned about who is using land, else 0 CWUL=0; CPVCY=1 if concerned 
about personal safety and privacy, else CPVCY=0; CADP=1 if landowner was concerned about 
damage to crops, timber or other property, else CADP=0; CLIN=1 if landowner was concerned 
about accident liability insurance, else CLIN=0.  We experimented with other attributes such as 
attitude towards wildlife hunting as well but severe estimation problems precluded their 
inclusion in the final specification.   
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics: Among these we include 4 of them.  These are 
race, RACE=1 if landowner identified himself/herself as Caucasian, else 0; residence, RLOC=1 
if landowner lived within 20 miles from his/her land, else 0; education whereby three alternative 
education levels were codified with EDU_H, EDU_C, and EDU_U that respectively indicate 
whether a landowner had high school, college or university degree.  We use EDU_U to serve as 
the base category.  Lastly, gender with GNDR=1 if male, else GNDR=0.  Inclusion of household 
income and credit constraints as additional socio-demographic factors created severe estimation 
problems and are thus omitted.   
   17
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Maximum likelihood estimation results given in Table 3 show that of the total number of 16 
coefficients (excluding intercept) in the hedonic pricing function, 9 are different from zero at the 
conventional level of significance and have the anticipated impact on lease rate.  Likewise, of the 
11 coefficients in the landowners’ participation function, 7 are highly significant and have the 
right signs.  Regression diagnostics revealed multicollinearity among variables as the major 
culprit of not having still a larger number of significant coefficients - a finding that is typical of 
hedonic pricing studies.  The overall fit is also highly significant suggesting confidence in the 
appropriateness of included explanatory variables.  Specification bias due to the omission of 
potentially important explanatory variable also does not appear to be a problem either, because 
based on regression specification error test (RESET) we did not find evidence of inadequacy. 
Furthermore, as the coefficient on inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is not significant, the null hypothesis 
of zero correlation (H0: ρ=0) between the hedonic pricing function and participation function 
cannot be rejected.  Thus, there is no selection bias involved and the conditional mean value of 
the annual lease rate per acre is an unbiased representation of lease rate at the overall market 
level.  Of the various functional forms we experimented with, the specification presented here 
provided the best fit.  Further discussion of the plausibility of estimation results follows:  
1. Elaborating on the estimated hedonic lease function, the finding that region specific dummy 
variables are significant agrees with the fact that the hunting lease market viewed at the state 
level is evolving (Yarrow and Yarrow 1999) and fragmented due to informational constraints.  It 
is only by controlling for market segmentation this way that we can obtain precise estimates of   18
the influence of variables on lease rate.  The percent marginal change
9 in lease revenue per acre 
in western Mississippi is quite large.  Associated figures given in the last column (Table 3) show 
that relative to eastern and southern Mississippi, this advantage could range from 45 to 60 
percent.   
The percent response of the lease rate with respect to scale of operations (LALSD) is negative 
suggesting that for landowners’ to lease additional acres, lease rate would need to be lowered.  
But this finding is not statistically significant indicating that demand for hunting sites is probably 
strong enough so that landowners do not need to lower rates in order to induce increase in sales.  
Reflective of the role of management in influencing lease rate, the coefficient on EXPNC is 
positive and highly significant.  Thus, landowner who are knowledgeable about business 
planning for a fee hunting access operation have a definite advantage (almost 47 percent) over 
otherwise similar landowners. The coefficient on the variable “provision of services such as 
blind/stands, guides and lodging” by landowners is statistically significant and has large 
marginal impact as one would expect. 
Regarding the two habitat specific attributes under the control of landowners, i.e., maintenance 
of permanent waterfowl impoundments by landowners as well as wildlife food plots, the results 
are statistically significant and have the expected a priori positive signs.  It turns out, however, 
                                                 
9 As none of the explanatory variables appear both in the hedonic and participation function, the 
expression for percent marginal effects for hedonic lease function are simpler than Eq-6.  For the 
dummy variable: 100 * } 1 )] ˆ ( * 5 . 0 ˆ [( { − − k k V Exp β β ; ii)  feeacres LALSD feeacres β ˆ ln / ln = ∂ ∂ ; iii) 
habitat attribute k x : k k k x x rev β ˆ / ln = ∂ ∂  
   19
that these services only account for 8-12 percent increase in lease revenue and has implications 
for landowners’ incentives to invest in habitat improvement.   
Empirical findings regarding the fixed wildlife habitat characteristics are vivid: relative to the 
base habitat category (of bottomland hardwoods and permanent water bodies such as streams, 
rivers and ponds), cutover forestland and mixed-pine-hardwoods are less preferred as expected.  
At the other end of the habitat spectrum, acreages allocated to aquaculture, pastures and orchards 
are preferred. The only inconclusive finding relates to the role of lands in pine plantations 
relative to the base category because the expectation was that the associated coefficient on the 
variable “percent share of pines lands” would be significantly negative.  While further analysis in 
this regards may be warranted,  collinearity diagnostics (variance inflation factors and pair wise 
partial correlations) showed significant correlation between acres leased and land under various 
agricultural and forestry uses.                                
2. Turning to the estimated landowners’ participation function, overall the fit seems to be quite 
reasonable.  The negative intercept coefficient of the probit index suggests that in general 
landowners are averse to the idea of allowing hunting access.
10  Of the set of independent 
variables, only the gender and dummy variables representing various levels of education do not 
appear to have significant relation with landowners’ willingness to allow hunting access.  
Landowners concerns, whether about who is using their lands, privacy and family safety, 
accident liability insurance and damage to crops, timber and other property, definitely seem to 
constrain broad based landowner participation.  In terms of percent marginal effect
11, a 
                                                 
10 Because if all other covariates in the participation are assumed to be unimportant, the predicted 
probability of participation given  , 2852 . 3 ˆ0 − = α  is zero, i.e., 0 ) 2852 . 3 ( ) ˆ ( ˆ 0 ≈ − Φ = Φ = α p  
11 Marginal effects for the participation equation are based on the expression: . ˆ ]. / ) ˆ ( [ j j i w w α α ∂ ′ Φ ∂    20
landowner who is concerned about who is using his/her land would have 5.20 percent less 
willingness to allow hunting access.  Likewise being a landowner who is concerned about 
damage to crops, timber and other property reduces such chances by 5.13 percent (table 3, 
column 3). Except for Zhang et al. (2005) who argue based on their findings that concern for 
accident liability insurance may not be a factor, probably because of the lack of actual lawsuits 
against landowners, the results here are consistent with findings by others (See for instance 
Conover and Messmer 2001).  Wright et al. (2002) documents that of the 15 hunting liability 
insurance cases filed against landowners in the past 4 decades, 9 were in the southeast US with 7 
alone were in the adjoining Louisiana state, 1 in Alabama – another adjoining state and 1 in 
Texas. Thus, concern about accident liability insurance is not just a perception problem; it is a 
reality landowners need to reckon with.   
The significant coefficient on residential location, RLOC, indicates that it is not only landowners 
who live on their rural property that are averse to allowing access but other rural landowners as 
well.  This finding resonates with findings by Newman, et al.(1996) and Wright et al. (1990, 
p.193) who showed that in response to the socio-demographic factors, landownership pattern in 
the southeast US is changing and that new landowners, who generally reside in urban areas, have 
pecuniary motives to own lands unlike traditional landowners.   
Lastly, the significant and positive coefficient on total acres owned, LAOWD, shows that having 
large ownership does induce landowners’ willingness to allow access.  Indicated by the estimated 
marginal effect given in Table 3 (column 3), owning 1 more acre of land increases the 
probability that a private landowner would allow hunting access on his/her land by about 2 
percent.  This is understandable because large landowners’ are considered to own lands for 
financial reasons (Newman and Wear 1993).  Furthermore, since risk aversion is a decreasing   21
function of wealth, large landowners can be expected to be less risk averse, ceteris paribus, and 
thus more likely to allow hunting access.    
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
    
1. The findings of this study suggest that location, expertise in managing and marketing a fee 
hunting enterprise, and provision of services by landowners largely account for the variation in 
the hunting unit lease rate in Mississippi.  While hunting site attributes, whether fixed or under 
the control of landowner, explain a relatively less share of the revenue, significant potential 
exists for enhancing this share.  The finding that certain landowners in certain regions of the state 
realize higher lease revenues than others points to importance of segmenting hunting lease 
market along regional lines while modeling in order to reduce chances of obtaining bias 
parameter estimates of hedonic lease function.  The positive influence of being knowledgeable 
about operating a fee hunting enterprise on lease revenues implies that public agencies with 
mandate for extension and outreach efforts would best advance natural resource based enterprise 
development if such efforts are focused on facilitating landowners’ entrepreneurial skills.   
The role of services provision such as blinds, guides and lodging in influencing lease revenues 
suggests landowners may be able to realize higher returns by investing in such efforts.  Given 
that providing guidance related services could be time consuming, it is likely that landowners 
with low opportunity cost of time would benefit more.   
Evidence that increases in lease revenue are associated with improvements in certain hunting site 
attributes suggests that landowners would have incentive to make such improvements.  The level 
of such investments would, however, depend on the cost of these improvements relative to 
potential returns.  Public agencies interested in conserving natural resources especially protecting   22
marginal lands would find it helpful to see if enough incentives exist for landowners to make 
socially desirable levels of improvements.     
2. That landowners who do not live near their land are more likely to allow hunting access is 
insightful. The fact that landownership patterns in the southeast US are dramatically changing 
such that most new landowners’ reside in urban areas, implies that hunting access on private 
lands in the future might increase.  The negative role of existing landowners’ concern for 
privacy, liability insurance, and damage to crops, timber and property, is, however, a fact that 
those interested in promoting hunting access on private lands must to reckon with.          
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Outcome Equation - Hedonic Lease Function                  
LNREV  Dependent variable: Logarithm of gross annual lease revenue per acre 
LTYP  If lease type is permits or short term lease, LTYP=1, else 0; 
EXPNC  If landowner is knowledgeable about fee-hunting business, EXPNC=1, else 0; 
DEAST  If leased land is located in eastern MS., DEAST=1, else 0;                  
DSOUTH  If leased land is located in southern MS., DSOUTH=1, else 0;               
DWEST  If leased land is located in western MS., DWEST=1, else 0; [BASE Category]  
SERVS  If landowner provided blinds, guides and lodging, PBGL=1, else 0;  
LALSD  Logarithm of the number of acres leased; 
PCROP  Percent of land under row crops and fallow;  
PLAQC  Percent of aquaculture & other land; 
PLOCD  Percent of land under orchards; 
PLOAG  Percent of land under other agricultural activities; 
PCUTOF  Percent of cutover forestland; 
PLMPINE  Percent of land under managed pine; 
PLMPH  Percent of land under mixed pine hardwoods; 
PLWFP  Percent of land allocated to wildlife food plots; 
PLWI  Percent of land under man made permanent water 
PLOAC  Percent of land allocated to other uses (power lines, residence, other);  
PBHWPW  Percent of land under bottomland hardwoods/water bodies; [BASE Category]   
 
Selection Equation – Willingness to allow Hunting Access 
LP  Dependent variable: LP=1, if landowner leased land for hunting, else LP=0 
LAOWD  Logarithm of all acres owned 
CWUL  If concerned about who is using land, CWUL=1, else 0; 
CPVCY  If concerned about privacy, CPVCY=1, else 0; 
CADP  If concerned about damage to property on land, CADP=1, else 0;  
CLIN  If concerned about accident liability insurance, CLIN=1, else 0;  
EDU_H  If landowners’ level of education is high school, EDU_H=1, else 0; 
EDU_C  If landowners’ level of education is College, EDU_H=1, else 0; 
RACE  If race is Caucasian, RACE=1, else 0 
GNDR  If gender is male, GNDR=1, else 0;  
RLOC  If residential location is rural, RLOC=1, else 0; 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of variables included in estimation 
Full Sample (n=468)  Lessors (n=77)   
Variables  Means St.Dev Means  St.Dev. 
I. Hedonic Lease Function 
LTYP 0.041  0.198  0.247  0.434 
EXPNC 0.105  0.306  0.130  0.338 
DEAST 0.312  0.464  0.312  0.466 
DSOUTH 0.194  0.396  0.169  0.377 
DWEST 0.494  0.501  0.519  0.503 
SERVS 0.026  0.158  0.156  0.365 
LALSD 1.016  2.340  6.172  1.180 
PCROP 1.508  8.466  9.166  19.216 
PLAQC 0.138  2.332  0.841  5.730 
PLOCD 0.084  1.559  0.509  3.835 
PLOAG 0.027  0.420  0.164  1.029 
PCUTOF 0.859  6.723  5.220  15.959 
PLMPINE 5.509  19.558  33.483  37.435 
PLMPH 5.155  18.320  31.331  35.092 
PLWFP 0.218  2.373  1.326  5.756 
PLWI 0.264  4.633  1.603  11.389 
PLOAC 0.306  3.196  1.861  7.736 
PBHWPW 1.958  10.153  11.900  22.661 
        
II. Willingness to allow Hunting Access 
LAOWD 5.963  0.995  6.594  1.037 
CWUL 0.562  0.497  0.026  0.160 
CPVCY 0.579  0.494  0.039  0.195 
CADP 0.498  0.501  0.026  0.160 
CLIN 0.577  0.495  0.052  0.223 
EDU_H 0.295  0.456  0.182  0.388 
EDU_C 0.496  0.501  0.584  0.496 
RACE 0.889  0.315  0.948  0.223 
GNDR 0.833  0.373  0.844  0.365 
RLOC 0.585  0.493  0.506  0.503 
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Marginal Effect (%) 
I. Hedonic Lease Function:  β X′  
Constant   2.1563  2.61   
LTYP -0.0849  -0.56  -9.18 
EXPNC       0.4006**  2.12  46.64 
DEAST   -0.8572*  -5.65  -58.05 
DSOUTH       -0.5706***  -1.84  -46.14 
SERVS        0.3829***  1.68  42.87 
LALSD -0.0453  -0.46  -4.53 
PCROP -0.0049  -1.11  -4.49 
PLAQC     0.0224*  2.59  1.88 
PLOCD   0.1234  1.59  6.29 
PLOAG     0.0877*  2.42  1.44 
PCUTOF   -0.0087*  -2.46  -4.54 
PLMPINE 0.0009  0.37  3.01 
PLMPH -0.0035  -1.56  -10.97 
PLWFP     0.0635*  3.82  8.42 
PLWI     0.0312*  10.69  5.00 
PLOAC -0.0632  -1.57  -11.76 
II. Willingness to allow Hunting Access:  α W′  
Constant -3.2852  -4.44   
LAOWD     0.4049*  3.90  1.88 
CWUL    -0.8530*  -2.93  -5.20 
CPVCY      -0.5287**  -2.13  -2.73 
CAPD    -0.9557*  -2.62  -5.13 
CLIN      -0.5398**  -2.04  -3.00 
EDU_H -0.0506  -0.18  -0.16 
EDU_C   0.1904  0.79  0.93 
GNDR -0.1232  -0.41  -0.63 
RACE     0.9945*  2.68  2.38 
RLOC        -0.3837***  -1.73  -1.90 
ρ -0.2101  -0.39   
σ     0.5675*  -5.47   
λ -0.1192  0.40   
Wald χ
2(16)        5178.5800     
Log pseudo-likelihood      -2330.2980     
Sample observations  468     
Censored 391     
Uncensored 77    
Wald test of independent equations (ρ = 0):  ) 1 (
2 χ =0.15;  > ob Pr
2 χ = 0.6959.   
*       Significant at 1 percent; 
**     Significant at 5 percent; 
***   Significant at 10 percent.  